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I. INTRODUCTION
McGirt v. Oklahoma and Sharp v. Murphy
constitute a resounding vindication of the bedrock principles of federal Indian law that 
 namely, that the 
sovereign rights of tribal governments remain intact unless and until Congress explicitly 
-Indian communities.1 This essay does not attempt to locate the 
* Riyaz Kanji, David Giampetroni, and Philip Tinker are attorneys with Kanji & Katzen, PLLC, a firm dedicated 
to protecting and enhancing the sovereignty and vitality of Indian nations and their members. The firm 
represented the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in both Sharp v. Murphy and McGirt v. Oklahoma, briefing and arguing 
the status of Muscogee (Creek) Reservation before the United States Supreme Court, and represented the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation and Seminole Nation of Oklahoma in briefing and argument before the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Murphy v. Royal.
1. 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020); 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020). 
1
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retains its treaty-protected rights to exercise sovereignty over its eastern Oklahoma 
Reservation. Those topics are well covered elsewhere in this Journal. This essay aspires to 
a more modest task, that of recounting some of the experiences of the Nation and the 
diverse coalition that supported its tireless efforts to protect its historic rights, efforts that 
McGirt.
II. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK
is now the State of Oklahoma from its historic homelands in the American southeast under 
the auspices of the Indian Removal Act of 1830.2 It is the story 
preserve the rights guaranteed to it under 1832 and 1833 removal treaties3 against near-
overwhelming historical forces operating in opposition to those rights; and of its fight to 
retain those rights through the trauma of removal, the waves of settlers and speculators 
that soon crashed over their new land, its eventual allotment, and of course the creation of 
the State of Oklahoma in the early 1900s. And it is the story of the Creeks thereafter 
struggling to preserve their government and the strength of their community throughout 
the twentieth century, the vast majority of which saw the federal and state governments 
and their non-Indian citizens acting as though those rights, and indeed the Nation itself, 
had been terminated.  
Thi
Murphy and McGirt case team was then a 2L at the 
University of Tulsa College of Law, and in need of a topic for a law review note to submit 
to this Journal. He stumbled upon a pair of then federal District Court cases that questioned 
the status of two tribal reservations in eastern Oklahoma, reservations which, according to 
all conventional wisdom at the time, had long since vanished.4 One of these cases was 
brought by the Osage Nation as a test case, an affirmative bid to re-establish its long 
dormant Reservation rights. The other was brought by a member of the Muscogee (Creek) 
Nation seeking to avoid the death penalty for a gruesome murder committed within the 
boundaries of the historic Creek Reservation.    
The resulting student note focused on the three-step Solem disestablishment test and 
concluded that the eastern Oklahoma reservations had never been abolished under it.5 It 
was the first Quixotic Murphy case. After 
the article was written but before its publication, the author attended his first Federal Indian 
Bar Association conference. There he encountered a number of like-minded law students 
from across Indian country who were equally confident that the eastern Oklahoma 
reservations had not been terminated by Congress under the Solem analysis. They were 
also equally and delightfully oblivious to the conventional wisdom that bad facts make 
 2. 4 Stat. 411 (1830). 
 3. Treaty with The Creeks, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366; Treaty with The Creeks, Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat 417. 
4. See , 597 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Okla. 2009); Murphy v. Sirmons, 
497 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (E.D. Okla. 2007).   
5. See Philip Tinker, Is Oklahoma Still Indian Country? Reservation Disestablishment in Murphy v. 
Sirmons and Osage Nation v. Irby, 9 DARTMOUTH L.J. 120 (2011). 
2
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b
regarding the consequences of Reservation status for entrenched non-Indian interests 
suggested that no prudent lawyer should waste their time tilting at this particular 
windmill.6
The student group made contact with federal public defender Patty Palmer Ghezzi, 
who represented Patrick Murphy in his federal habeas corpus action, and would continue 
s
provided Ms. Ghezzi an outstanding lawyer with substantial background in federal 
Indian law and its frequently contested application in Oklahoma with (possibly over-
enthusiastic and unsolicited) legal research and consultation regarding the issues 
implic
procedural limbo for many years after these initial efforts, as the reservation issue took a 
back seat to other substantive and procedural criminal law issues also presented by the 
matter. The delay proved critical. For it meant that, although the Oklahoma Court of 
Eastern District of Oklahoma had affirmed that decision in 2007, the issue would not reach 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit before the Supreme Court decided 
Nebraska v. Parker nearly a decade later in 2016.7   
III. NEBRASKA V. PARKER
Parker was a game-changer with respect to the Solem disestablishment analysis.8
Parker affirmed the continued existence of a disputed portion of the Omaha Reservation 
-Indian population.9
10   
Parker importance cannot be overstated. In the decades since Solem, federal 
courts, including the Supreme Court, had been drifting from Solem -one emphasis 
-three emphasis on the 
11 T
City of Sherrill, while not technically a disestablishment case, was appearing in 
-
three.12 Parker authored by Justice Thomas for a unanimous Court seemed intended 
to halt that drift (at least in the disestablishment context) and direct the analysis back 
 6. During the ensuing decade, far too many individuals contributed to the author s Quixotic quest to be able 
to list here. In the beginning, the core group came primarily from the University of Tulsa, University of Arizona, 
and Arizona State University and included Jasen Chadwick, Kevin Heade, Michael Corey Hinton, William 
Patrick Kincaid, Joe Keene, Brian Lewis, and Tonya Thurman. 




 11. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994). 
12. See, e.g., Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1128 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Sherrill). 
3
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toward the textual emphasis of Solem 13 The Court emphasized that Congress 
must act directly and speak clearly in order to disestablish a reservation, with several 
passages in the opinion sending a strong signal to the lower courts that, when it comes to 
determining the modern-day existence and scope of tribal rights, it is congressional intent, 
as discerned through the interpretive tools of textualism, that rules the day, and that an 
absence of clear language terminating tribal rights cannot be overcome by post-hoc 
analysis of the actions or settled expectations of governmental actors and non-Indian 
interest holders.14
Parker, in short, breathed new life into the previously fanciful notion that the federal 
courts might look past a century of conventional wisdom and hold that long dormant 
reservation borders like those of the Five Tribes can remain intact if no statute or treaty 
has explicitly terminated them, notwithstanding the effects that this renewed recognition 
might have on State and local governments or on non-Indian interests in the reservation 
ot released 
from its decade of procedural limbo, and put back on track for briefing at the Tenth Circuit, 
until January of 2016, which meant that Parker, issued in May of that same year, would 
weigh heavily in the future of the case.   
In light of Parker, the Creek Nation and other Five Tribes tribal governments began 
to focus attention on the Murphy case with a sense of cautious optimism. Shortly after the 
decision issued, the Creek Nation and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma decided to submit 
an amicus brief in the Tenth Circuit arguing that the treaty rights that established and 
protected the Creek Reservation remained intact because Congress had not taken the 
legislative steps necessary to terminate those rights.15
At this point the first leg of the Quixotic journey was complete, and what started as 
a pie-in-the-
the continued existence of the Creek Reservation.     
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
Briefing the case for the Tenth Circuit presented a number of challenges. This essay 
highlights two of them, the first one strategic or doctrinal, and the second practical. These 
two challenges required the legal team to thread a delicate needle, making the most 
forceful case possible that the Creek Reservation had not been terminated, without 
stepping on the looming landmines, which may have provided justifications for a hesitant 
Court to conclude that the tribal position was either foreclosed by Circuit precedent, 
subject to a procedural bar, or simply incompatible with the weight of the historical 
expectations and assumptions that these lands had long ago been stripped of any vestiges 
of the former reservation boundaries.   
A. Threading the Needle 
A major strategic question was how to address Parker in terms of its impact on 
13. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072. 
14. Id.
15. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, Murphy 
v. Royal, 866 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 07-7068).  
4
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existing case-
habeas corpus challenge arose under the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1995.16 This law generally precludes federal courts from overturning a State court 
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
17 If the Tribal Amici had taken the position that Parker dramatically revised the 
law of reservation diminishment and overturned prior precedent, this could have led the 
Court to find that regardless of whether the Creek Reservation would be considered intact 
under Parker  that question if the legal standards in 
place prior to Parker dictated a contrary conclusion.   
outcome for Mr. Murphy, but to preserve the treaty rights in issue.18 But there was another 
reason the Tribal Amici were hesitant to embrace an interpretation of Parker as upending 
pre-Parker caselaw.
The Tenth Circuit had previously decided a case involving reservation rights in 
Eastern Oklahoma.19
Solem -three mentioned above, the Court, citing City of Sherrill, held that the Osage 
Reservation had been disestablished when it was allotted, and based this conclusion largely 
on historical assumptions about allotment and 
-day residents, rather than any specific statutory language thought 
20 Moreover, 
Osage Nation did not rely simply on historical assumptions and understandings specific to 
 already implemented an allotment process with the Five 
Civilized Tribes that extinguished national and tribal title to lands within the territory and 
21
Osage Nation, then, loomed as an inhospitable precedent for the argument that the 
Creek Reservation had not in fact been disestablished. If Parker had not intervened, it may 
not have been possible to convince the Circuit to hold that the Creek Reservation had 
indeed survived allotment. However, arguing that Circuit precedent was incorrect and had 
been repudiated by the more recent Supreme Court decision ran a significant risk. The 
Supreme Court in Parker did not profess to repudiate any pre-Parker caselaw and indeed 
22 Thus, the Tenth Circuit would have 
had credible grounds to find that Osage Nation was undisturbed by Parker, and 
accordingly remained controlling in Murphy. By telling the Court that it should reject 
Osage Nation as inconsistent with Parker, the Tribal Amici would have been signaling 
 16. Murphy, 866 F.3d at 1178. 
    17.   28 U.S.C. 2254 (d)(1).
 18. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma at n.2, 
Murphy, 866 F.3d 1164 (No. 07-7068) (Tribes took no position  on the procedural issues in Mr. Murphy s case). 
 19. Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 20. See id. at 1124 ( the operative language of the statute does not unambiguously suggest diminishment or 
disestablishment of the Osage reservation. ). 
21. Id.
 22. Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1072.   
5
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that their arguments could not be squared with Osage Nation. This may have been fatal to 
the Reservation rights claims if the Circuit had elected to read Parker as simply a 
reaffirmation of settled law. 
Still, Parker represented the then high-water mark for precedents recognizing the 
preservation of reservation boundaries despite the passage of time and widespread 
understanding that those boundaries had long since vanished. To have any chance of 
success at all, the Tribal Amici brief needed to embrace Parker to the fullest extent.  
However, it was equally necessary to frame Parker as being fully consistent with prior 
Supreme Court caselaw and the Circuit precedent developed in reliance on that caselaw.  
The brief accordingly described Parker
th 23 This was no contradiction, 
because Parker in fact checked both these boxes. Its singular importance lay in the fact 
that it emphatically instructed the lower courts to return their primary focus to the textual 
factors that Solem and prior disestablishment decisions had emphasized, rather than 
hinging decisions on non-textual factors that were originally understood to be of secondary 
and tertiary importance.   
Happily, the Tenth Circuit saw the world in the same way. In his thoroughly 
considered, 126-page opinion for a unanimous panel, Judge Matheson explained that, 
Nebraska v. Parker -
Solem 24 And throughout his opinion, he cited Solem and Osage Nation as 
controlling, but consistently did so through the lens of, and with parallel citation to, 
Parker.25
B. Supplementing the Record 
Another major challenge that the legal team faced related to the record, and more 
specifically the lack thereof. Due in no small part to procedural complications in the State 
court proceedings, the case reached the Tenth Circuit with virtually no development of the 
historical or contemporary evidence bearing on the questions of reservation 
disestablishment. While disestablishment is a question of statutory or treaty interpretation, 
under Parker, historical context remained significant in determining the meaning of the 
relevant text, particularly with respect to the negotiation records of the allotment 
agreements and statutes that severed the reservation land base from communal tribal 
ownership and documents reflecting how Tribal, federal, and State actors interpreted and 
enforced those statutes and agreements in the critical years immediately following 
allotment.   
Under ideal circumstances, a tribe whose Reservation rights are in issue would be 
involved in the case from an early stage and could submit an expert witness report 
providing the critical historical evidence and context necessary for the Court to fully 
evaluate the meaning the parties to an agreement would have attributed to it at the time.  
Unfortunately, reservation boundaries claims are frequently brought by criminal 
23. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, Murphy,
866 F.3d 1164 (No. 07-7068). 
 24. Murphy, 875 F.3d at 930. 
25. See generally id.
6
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relevant historical context and may not possess the resources to ensure that this evidence 
comes into the record. Such was the case in Murphy, where the Nation had not been 
involved in those early stages and accordingly submitted no such materials. 
Given that the case was already up on appeal, there was no ability to submit a 
comprehensive historical report. Accordingly, the legal team in Murphy had to fill in the 
decision, it was understood that the State would be arguing that the purpose of the federal 
ment agreement with the Five Tribes was to set the table 
for terminating their sovereign rights and reservation land base. Under Parker and Solem,
26
showing that everyone involved tribal, federal, and affected non-Indian citizens
understood this to be the case. Fortunately, the historical record was not unequivocal, and 
significant evidence existed supporting a contrary historical narrative, one that showed a 
Creek Nation (like others of the Five Tribes) unwavering in its commitment to preserving 
its sovereignty and treaty rights against immense pressure to relinquish both.   
Key sources the team was able to draw on included the accounts from the Dawes 
Commission the negotiation team dispatched by Congress to negotiate with the Five 
Tribes for the allotment of their lands in anticipation of Oklahoma Statehood. At first 
glance, there was cause for concern that these records could be viewed as supporting the 
. The Dawes Commission was established by Congress  
for the purpose of the extinguishment of the national or tribal title to any lands within [the 
Indian] Territory . . . either by cession of the same or some part thereof to the United States, 
or by the allotment and division of the same in severalty among the Indians of such nations.27   
Taken in isolation and stripped of its historical context, this language could be read 
to suggest the very thing that Courts can rely on to find diminishment an explicit desire 
territorial rights that inhere in reservation status. This is in fact how the State construed 
this language in its brief, citing it as one of many Congres
28     
However, a deeper exploration into the historical record revealed that the history of 
the Five Tribes told a far different story. In its 
first Annual Report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1894, the Dawes Commission 
reported that: 
Early interviews . . . satisfied us that the Indians would not, under any circumstances, agree 
to cede any portion of their lands to the Government, but would insist that if any agreements 
were made for allotment of their lands it should all be divided equally among them . . . . 
Finding this unanimity among the people against the cession of any of their lands to the 
United States, we abandoned all idea of purchasing any of it and determined to offer them 
an equal division of their lands.29
 26. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072. 
 27. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. 612. 
 28. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 57 58, Murphy, 866 F.3d 1164 (No. 07-7068). 
 29. COMMISSION TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES, ANNUAL REPORTS OF 1894, 1895, AND 1896, at 14 (1897).   
7
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Six years later, in its final Report, the Commission confirmed that it had made no 
further progress in its efforts to negotiate for the cession of tribal lands and extinguishment 
of their rights to those lands:   
Had it been possible to secure from the Five Tribes a cession to the United States of the 
entire territory at a given price, . . . the duties of the commission would have been 
immeasurably simplified . . . When an understanding is had, however, of the great 
difficulties which have been experienced in inducing the tribes to accept allotment in 
severalty . . . it will be seen how impossible it would have been to have adopted a more 
radical scheme of tribal extinguishment, no matter how simple its evolutions.30    
These are but a few examples of how the historical record worked to undermine the 
conventional historical narrative and demonstrate that the actual experiences of the Tribal 
and federal actors living through the historical period in question were quite different than 
many unexamined modern assumptions would hold. To be sure, as noted, there was some 
t narrative. But evidence of 
diminishment had to be unequivocal to hold any sway in the analysis, and it was far from 
that here. As the Tenth Circuit concluded in Murphy,
that 
the Creek Reservation was disestablished, Mr. Murphy and the Creek Nation have 
The step-two evidence is at most debatable, and we need not parse it further because 
ambiguous evidence cannot overcome the missing statutory text at step one. See Hagen, 510 
U.S. at 411.  . . 
. . 31
B. En Banc Review 
The Creek Nation, alas, would not leave the Tenth Circuit with its reservation status 
totally unquestioned or unscathed. For while the Circuit denied en banc review, Chief 
Judge Tymkovich (who concurred in that denial and was indeed a member of the original 
panel) encouraged Supreme Court review, and in decidedly ominous terms.32 He first 
historical evidence at step two of the Solem framework: Supreme Court precedent . . . 
requires that evidence of intent to dises  . . . History, however, is 
not always well suited to provide the unequivocal evidence of disestablishment 
that Solem requires. Sometimes history is ambiguous, making it impossible to decide 
between competing narratives. 33
The Chief Judge then turned to step three: This case may present the high-water 
mark of de facto disestablishment: the boundaries of the Creek Reservation . . . encompass 
a substantial non-Indian population, including much of the city of Tulsa; and Oklahoma 
claims the decision will have dramatic consequences for taxation, regulation, and law 
 30. SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 9, reprinted in H. Doc. 
No. 5, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. (1901) (1900 Commission Report). 
 31. Murphy, 875 F.3d at 959 60.  
32. See id. (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
 33. Id. at 967. 
8
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enforcement. 34
Thus, where Parker had appeared to stem the drift among courts away from the step-
one emphasis on text toward the atextual considerations at steps two and three, the Chief 
Judge was urging that, at least in the singular context of Oklahoma, steps two and three 
should predominate: 
[T]his may be the rare case where the Supreme Court wishes to enhance Steps Two and 
Three of Solem if it can be persuaded that the square peg of Solem is ill suited for the round 
hole of Oklahoma statehood . . . . In sum, this challenging and interesting case makes a good 
candidate for Supreme Court review.35
The Supreme Court accepted that invitation, with the United States taking the rare 
requested its views.   
V. ROUND ONE AT THE SUPREME COURT: MURPHY
A. Merits Briefing 
The State of Oklahoma, represented by specialist, highly experienced counsel in the 
blazing. Its petition for certiorari and its opening brief on the merits placed heavy and 
forceful emphasis on the historical evidence that Congress anticipated the demise of the 
Creek Nation and its Reservation; and equal or perhaps even greater emphasis on the later 
36
second- -page color photograph of 
downtown Tulsa, Oklahoma, and a declaration that acknowledging the Creek Reservation 
would shock the 1.8 million residents of eastern Oklahoma 
who have universally understood that they reside on land regulated by state government, 
37
textual argument was its least compelling, Oklahoma placed decidedly less emphasis on 
that prong of the Solem framework, and barely mentioned Parker.
two and three of the Solem analysis and the quality and force with which its narrative 
was written meant that the team could not over-rely on Parker and had to account for 
-water mark of de facto t
Parker was beside the point.38 This meant that, although Parker
34. Id. at 967 68.  
 35. Id. at 967. 
36. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Murphy, 866 F.3d 1164 (No. 07-7068); Brief for Petitioner, Murphy,
866 F.3d 1164 (No. 07-7068). 
37. See sources cited supra note 36. 
38. See Murphy, 875 F.3d at 967 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
9
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brief, the Nation nevertheless had to devote a significant portion of its sharply limited word 
count much more than it would have had it been confident that Parker was the governing 
framework
Court team, consisting of Ms. Ghezzi and the excellent Jenner & Block firm (with a group 
headed by former Acting Solicitor General Ian Gershengorn), would devote considerable 
attention to textual analysis in its briefing. 
With respect to the arguments about modern-
quickly concluded that it was important not simply to play defense on the issue (the sky 
will not fall if the Nation wins) but to tell an affirmative story about the tremendous 
governmental contributions the Nation makes throughout its Reservation area, 
contributions that benefit both Nation citizens and non-citizens alike and that would be 
disestablishment holding. The material for this story was well in hand. For while the State 
wanted to focus on Tulsa, in the northeastern corner of the Reservation, the vast majority 
of the Reservation is rural and, in low-tax Oklahoma, far from amply served by the State 
critical: in areas ranging from public safety (with its highly sophisticated Lighthorse police 
force) to infrastructure to the running of hospitals and health care clinics to family violence 
prevention and counseling, the Nation acts to enhance the safety and welfare of all within 
the Reservation borders.39
be within the normal cognizance of the Court, and they were well worth educating the 
Court about.   
The Nation was aided immeasurably in countering 
narrative about the consequences of reservation affirmation by stellar amicus briefs filed 
by others. The National Congress of American Indians, in a brief authored by Colette 
Routel and Bethany Berger, detailed how sizeable non-Indian population centers thrive on 
reservations across the country, with reservation status often (as in the case of the Creek 
Nation) resulting in considerable benefits for non-Indians as well as tribal members.40
Troy Eid and Jennifer Weddle authored a brief on behalf of former United States Attorneys 
(of whom Troy is one) explaining with great authority that Congress is well capable of 
addressing any criminal justice issues arising out of continued reservation status, and that 
it has done so successfully in other instances.41 The guest editor of this volume, Mary 
Kathryn Nagle, joined with Professor Sarah Deer to write a brief for the National 
fleshing out for the Court the grave problems with 
domestic violence that have arisen across the country where tribal governmental powers 
have been handicapped, a point with particular pertinence given the nationally-recognized 
42 Susan Work and Stacy 
 39. See Brief Amici Curiae Muscogee (Creek) Nation in Support of Respondent, Carpenter v. Murphy, 139 
S. Ct. 626 (2020) (No. 17-1107). 
40. See Brief for National Congress of American Indians as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Sharp,
140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107). 
41. See Brief Amici Curiae of Former United States Attorneys Troy A. Eid, Barry R. Grissom et al. in Support 
of Respondent, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107).  
42. See Brief of Amici Curiae
10
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Leeds authored a brief on behalf of Indian law scholars and historians complementing 
relevant histories of the other Five Tribes.43   
And in what was a truly unique submission, Robert Henry (former Chief Judge of 
the Tenth Circuit), Michael Burrage, Steve Greetham, Brad Mallett, and the Sonosky firm 
wrote a brief on behalf of the Chickasaw Nation, the Choctaw Nation, and current and 
former State of Oklahoma elected officials, including high-ranking officials in State 
government and Congressman Tom Cole, a senior member of the House Republican 
leadership and co-chair of the Congressional Native Caucus.44 Yes, you read all that 
right a collaborative brief between Indian nations and State officials, which touted the 
collaboration between the Five Tribes and the State and local units of government 
throughout eastern Oklahoma on a wide variety of issues. It is hard to think of a more 
nsequences than a brief like 
this (and sure enough, it, like several of the other amicus briefs, was cited by Justice 
Gorsuch in his eventual opinion for the Court in McGirt).45
By the end of briefing, the case had taken on a binary feel. On one side, the Creek 
Reservation would stand if the case were decided with a step-one emphasis on text and 
Parker
Sherrill, with the Nation pushing back 
vigorously while trying to keep the focus, as was Mr. Murphy, on the text. And oral 
argument reflected that divide. Justice Gorsuch, who had sat on a Tenth Circuit panel that 
proceedings, recused 
himself when the case reached the Court, leaving eight Justices to decide it. Three of them 
focused their questions on the intent of Congress as reflected in statutory text i.e., step 
the reservation?); (Sotamayor, J.: 
46 And three of them, through a Sherrill-esque lens, 
focused on practical consequences and the disruption of settled expectations: (Alito, J.: 
. . 
. eastern Oklahoma?  of [gaming] in the 
( . . . we would be . . . 
creating a great deal of turmoil. . . . all the practical implications 
47 Meanwhile, Justice Ginsburg asked a single, 
Organizations for Survivors of Domestic Violence and Assault in Support of Respondent, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 
(No. 17-1107).  
43. See Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and Cherokee Nation in Support of Respondent, 
Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107). 
44. See Brief of Amici Curiae David Boren, Brad Henry et al. in Support of Respondent, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 
2412 (No. 17-1107). 
 45. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2499. 
 46.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 4 lns.24 25, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107); Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 20 lns.17 18, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107); Transcript of Oral Argument at 32 ln.4, Sharp,
140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107).  
 47. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28 lns.18 22, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107); Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 55 lns.20 25; Transcript of Oral Argument at 56 lns.1 4, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 72 lns.8 10, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107).  
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largely unrevealing, question;48 and Justice Thomas asked none. It was not lost on the 
team that these two reticent Justices were the authors, respectively, of Sherrill and 
Parker.49
B. Supplemental Briefing 
Given the strong cross-currents at argument, it would have been even more foolish 
what presumably would be a several-month wait until a decision. But word from the Court 
came much sooner than that. Oral argument in Murphy took place on November 27, 2018.  
One week later the Court ordered supplemental briefing on two issues: 
(1) Whether any statute grants the state of Oklahoma jurisdiction over the prosecution of 
crimes committed by Indians in the area within the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek 
which land qualifies as an Indian reservation but nonetheless does not meet the definition of 
Indian country as set forth in 18 U. S. C. §1151(a).50
While somewhat dismayed at a personal level by a briefing order that promised to 
predicate was continued reservation status. Which meant that the Nation was still very 
much alive and in the game.    
In the weeks that followed, a few observers raised the question whether it would be 
strategically prudent to simply concede that the State has criminal jurisdiction, and in so 
doing preserve the broader suite of tribal authority inherent in reservation status. There 
were two significant problems with this approach. First, jurisdiction and sovereignty are 
not matters of expedience, and the Nation was not willing to engage in horse-trading to 
preserve a reservation that, with enough concessions of the sort suggested, would end up 
being one in name only. Second, the law provided no credible basis to offer up the 
found no statute 
expressly transferring criminal jurisdiction to the State an express transfer being the 
accepted standard for such a fundamental shift in governmental authority. The Nation laid 
out its findings for the Court, and this time settled in for a wait that turned out to be much 
longer than expected. For when the last day of the Term arrived, the Court announced that 
it was holding Murphy over for re-argument.51
calls and notes expressing condolences at the lack of a decision. But there was no cause 
for consolation. The Nation was still alive. The Court had rung the bell for another round, 
and the Nation and all others involved in this epic fight would answer it.   
VI. ROUND TWO AT THE SUPREME COURT: MCGIRT
A case that had witnessed its share of unusual developments had one more major 
 48. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35 lns.11 18, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107).  
 49. Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197; Nebraska, 136 S. Ct. 1072.  
 50. Order for Supplemental Briefs, Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626 (No. 17-1107).  
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one in store. When the Court released its argument calendars for the early months of the 
next Term, Murphy was nowhere to be seen.52 The Nation and Murphy teams fairly 
quickly surmised that the Court had a new plan in mind: the Court had a number of other 
cases in the pipeline in which criminal defendants were challenging their convictions on 
the same reservation basis as Mr. Murphy. Some of those cases came out of the State court 
system, meaning that they would not raise a recusal issue for Justice Gorsuch. Sure 
enough, in December of 2019 the Court granted certiorari in the State court case of Jimcy 
McGirt v. State of Oklahoma.53 A nine-justice Court would decide the fate of the Creek 
Reservation. 
It was natural to think that, in the new proceedings, Justice Gorsuch might act to 
break what could have been a 4-4 logjam in Murphy (and that an equally divided Court 
had not simply wanted to affirm without an opinion in Murphy due to the historic and 
practical significance of the case). That was not necessarily true. The complexities 
introduced by the supplemental questions suggested the possibility of other approaches 
and coalitions on the Court. But, leaving those nuances aside, it is not surprising that the 
new briefs filed by the State, the United States, Mr. McGirt, and the Nation all sought to 
    
Fortunately, this was a much easier fit for the Nation and Mr. McGirt than for the 
also his book, 
A Republic, If You Can Keep It.54 It was happy reading. Several core features of Justice 
became crystal clear, and they were fully consistent with the c
nowhere made clear an intent to do so, and that subsequent events (including a brazen 
ire consequences could not substitute 
for Congressional action.55 Perhaps most importantly, the extent to which Justice Gorsuch 
is a fervent believer in the separation of powers and its critical role in sustaining our 
republic infused his book and opinions. His commitment to maintaining a proper respect 
for the coordinate branches of government applies forcefully to the field of Indian affairs, 
Justice Gorsuch is of course a strict textualist, hewing faithfully to the language of treaties 
and statutes, and has made plain his view that the courts should not depart from textual 
conclusions favoring the tribes because of dire predictions about the consequences of 
doing so. His writings also demonstrated that he is a keen student of history, and that, 
perhaps in part because of his western roots, he has an understanding that Tribes, States, 
and local governments can work well together, and that inter-governmental cooperation 
rather than domination is in the best interests of all citizens.    
 52. Calendars and Lists: Session Beginning October 7, 2019, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/calendarsandlists.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2021). 
 53. Order Granting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (No. 18-9526). 
 54. NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT (Crown Forum ed., 2019). 
55. See generally id.
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that he ultimately penned for the Court.56 Many of the infringements on tribal sovereignty 
over the last few decades have resulted from courts imposing their views as to what the 
limitations on tribal sovereignty should be, rather than respecting the will of Congress.  
Justice Gorsuch refused to travel that road, and along with others on the Court, including 
especially Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, his deep interest in and fidelity to fundamental 
Indian law cases.   
VII. CONCLUSION
are deeply appreciative of the contributions of so many to the legal effort, and above all 
else remain in awe of the sheer determination and force of will that have enabled the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation and its people not only to endure but to flourish anew.  
 56. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2499. 
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